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Vol. 7(5), 2007


Vol. 7(4), 2007

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Vol. 7(4), 2007 - Section Logic

Logics of deontic inconsistency

Marcelo E. Coniglio
Department of Philosophy, IFCH, and
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science (CLE)
State University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Campinas, SP, Brazil
Security and Quantum Information Group (SQIG), IST/IT, Portugal
coniglio@cle.unicamp.br

Date Posted: August, 14th 2007                                      Download Files:  [PDF]     [PS]

ABSTRACT: The Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) are paraconsistent logics which internalize the notions of consistency and inconsistency by means of connectives. Based on that idea, in this paper we propose two deontic systems in which contradictory obligations are allowed, without trivializing the system. Thus, from conflicting obligations and O§ contained in (or derived from) an information set, it can be derived that the sentenceʧ is deontically inconsistent. This avoids the logic collapse, and, on the other hand, this allows to "repair" or to refine the given information set. This approach can be used for analyzing paradoxes based on contrary-to-duty obligations.

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