Prof. Nathan Houser (Indiana University-USA)
It is generally agreed that what distinguishes practical reasoning from reasoning more generally is that practical reasoning 
properly results in action rather than in conceptual conclusions. 
There is much disagreement, however, as to how appropriate actions can follow from practical reasoning and it is commonly supposed that the connection between reasoning and action can neither be truly inferential nor truly 
causal. Peirce appears to challenge this common assumption. Although he would agree that conscious and deliberate argumentation results in 
conceptual conclusions (mental states) rather than in practical action, his extended semiotic account of mental activity allows for unconscious 
(instinctive or habitual) cognitive processing that, while properly inferential, genuinely concludes in action rather than in conceptual 
states. Peirce acknowledges that for practical reasoning to properly conclude in action, it is necessary for final (semiotic) causation to 
operate in conjunction with efficient causation and how this can be explained remains problematic. But his account is rich and promising and 
has much to contribute to contemporary research on practical reasoning.