Profa. Dra. Malena León


According to Paul & Stokes (2023), the question of strong artificial creativity is whether a computer could really be creative. According to Boden (2014), there are two different ways of answering this question in the negative: either computers have a property that makes them non-creative, or computers lack a property necessary for creativity. One candidate for this second route is consciousness, implying that computers are denied creativity due to their lack of consciousness.

While folk beliefs about creativity have generally viewed consciousness as an obstacle rather than a facilitator, researchers have argued that consciousness is a key aspect in facilitating creative processes, and have provided empirical support for this (Baumeister et al, 2014).

Although Baumeister et al. (2014) are not concerned with artificial creativity but with human creativity, their theory could support the thesis that lack of consciousness impedes artificial creativity. I will argue that this is not an adequate argument. I will argue that lack of consciousness (in the sense of Baumeister et al.) is not a good reason to deny creativity to computer programs. To do this, I will draw on Marta Halina's (2021) analysis of the AlphaGo computer program. 



Baumeister, R. F., Schmeichel, B. J., & DeWall, C. N. (2014). “Creativity and consciousness: Evidence from psychology experiments”, in: Paul, E. S., & Kaufman, S. B. (Eds.). (2014). The philosophy of creativity: New essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 185-198.

Boden, M. A. (2014). Creativity and artificial intelligence: A contradiction in terms. The philosophy of creativity: New essays, 224-46.

Halina, M. (2021). “Insightful artificial intelligence”. Mind & Language, 36(2), 315-329.

Paul, E. S., Stokes, D. "Creativity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <>.


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