The Bochum Plan and the foundations of contra-classical logics
The Bochum Plan is a very general semantic approach to logic based on the two-valued relational semantics for FDE, where a plethora of logics is obtained by tweaking the truth or falsity conditions for the connectives. The question I am interested in here is whether the Bochum Plan is more than an excellent machinery for systematically crafting or modeling crazy logics, or whether it can serve as a semantic project in a more robust way, a plan properly speaking: a semantic theory that serves to explain the more distinctive features of a (family of) logic(s) and even to make them plausible to some extent. My main claim is that, in spite of its impressive achievements, there is much yet to be told if the Bochum Plan is going to serve as an even wider theory of logics. In particular, three objectives should be attained if one aims at such a more general theory of logics: first, if one detaches the Bochum Plan from the idea of leaving the truth conditions fixed, which seems unessential to the Plan although it served excellently to exemplify its power; second, if one frees the Plan from the FDE-like presentation of logics, so more possibilities can be covered; third, if one can provide at least some rough admissibility criteria for the tweakings required by the Bochum Plan. In doing this, one could glimpse to new, more elaborate theories for the meaning of logical connectives.