Indistinguibilidade, não-reflexividade, ontologia e física quântica
It is reasonable to assume that non-relativistic quantum mechanics commits us with an ontology of objects which can be seen as both absolutely indistinguishable and as lacking individuality in some sense. In this paper we first pose in a general setting the nature of this commitment, how it can be understood in metaphysical terms, and its relationships with the logical systems employed to talk about those objects we are committed with. Then we present some of the main aspects of orthodox quantum mechanics which are usually employed to provide arguments suggesting an ontology of objects having these features, that is, being indistinguishable and having no individuality. In the final part of the paper, we sketch the main features of quasi-set theory, a system of set theory whose purpose is to capture formally these features in a natural way and, so, may be employed as the underlying logic in grounding a metaphysics of non-individuals.
Key-words: quantum mechanics, ontology, non-individuality, indistinguishability, quasi-sets.