O Estatuto Cognitivo dos Conceitos Psicológicos
Resumo
Este artigo procura discutir o estatuto cognitivo dos conceitos da psicologia, sendo esta disciplina inserida em um sistema da ciência unificada. O sistema de Carnap em seu Aufbau é aqui discutido, em especial no que diz respeito aos tipos de conceitos que ele adota (autopsicológicos, físicos, heteropsicológicos e culturais). Carnap escolhe os objetos ou conceitos autopsicológicos como básicos, em seu sistema. No que diz respeito à psicologia, ele pensa que o behaviorismo metodológico de Watson poderia ganhar um lugar na ciência unificada. Delineamos aqui um sistema alternativo, que é fundamentado nas doutrinas de Neurath e Skinner, respectivamente, o behaviorismo social e o behaviorismo radical. Neste sistema alternativo, os objetos culturais formam a base do sistema, a partir dos quais, todos os outros objetos (psicológicos, físicos, etc.) são construídos. Ainda que o tipo de abordagem adotada por Carnap não seja mais comum na filosofia da ciência, as discussões apresentadas neste artigo são uma oportunidade para avaliar os próprios compromissos ontológicos que estão por trás da abordagem de Carnap, assim como o tipo de compromisso que em geral é necessário para alcançar um sistema da ciência unificada e, dentro dele, providenciar um lugar para a psicologia. Palavras-chave: ciência unificada; behaviorismo social; behaviorismo radical; filosofia da psicologia.Downloads
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Referências
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BOYD, R. N. 1981. Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology. In:
ASQUITH e GIERRE, 1981, p. 613-662.
–––––. The Logician’s Dilemma: Deductive Logic, Inductive Inference and
Logical Empiricism.” Erkenntnis 22, 1985, p. 197-252.
CARNAP, R. 1959a. The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of
Language. In: AYER, 1959, p. 60-81.
–––––. 1959b. Psychology in Physical Language. In: AYER, 1959, p. 165-198.
–––––. The Logical Structure of the World. Berkeley e Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1969.
–––––. The Unity of Science. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1995 [1934].
DENNETT, D. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass., e London: The MIT Press,
1987.
GARDNER, H. The Mind’s New Science. New York: Basic Books, 1987.
GIERE, R. N. (org.). Cognitive Models of Science. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, vol. XV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
HANSON, N. R. Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1958.
HERRNSTEIN, R. J. The Matching Law. Papers in Psychology and Economics. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.
HOUTS, A. C. & HADDOCK, C. K. Answers to Philosophical and Sociological
Uses of Psychologism in Science Studies: a Behavioral Psychology of
Science. In: GIERE, 1992, p. 367-99.
KUHN, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1970.
NEURATH, O. (1959a). Protocol Sentences. In: AYER, 1959, p. 199-208.
–––––. (1959b). Sociology and Physicalism. In: AYER, 1959, p. 282-317.
–––––. Foudations of the Social Sciences. In: NEURATH, et al. 1970.
NEURATH, O., CARNAP, R. & MORRIS, C. (orgs.) Foudations of the Unity of Science.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
QUINE, W.V.O. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1960.
–––––. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press,
1969.
–––––. The Roots of Reference. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974.
–––––. On Mental Entities. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 221-7.
–––––. On What There Is. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1980 [1953].
RACHLIN, H. Behavior and Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
RUSSELL, B. The Analysis of Mind. London: Routledge, 1997 [1921].
SCHWARTZ, B., e LACEY, H.M. Behaviorism, Science, and Human Nature. New York:
Norton, 1982.
SKINNER, B.F. Science and Human Behavior. New York: MacMillan, 1953.
–––––. Verbal Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957.
–––––. Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis. New Jersey: PrenticeHall,
1969.
–––––. About Behaviorism. London: Jonathan Cape, 1976.
STADDON, J. R. Behaviorism: Mind, Mechanism and Society. London: Duckworth,
1993.
VAN FRAASSEN, B.C. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
–––––. Empiricism in Philosophy of Science. In: CHURCHLAND, P.M. e HOOKER,
C.A. (orgs.), Images of Science, Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1985, p. 245-308.
WATSON, J.B. Behaviorism. New York: Norton, 1970 [ 1930].