O moralmente bom e o moralmente mau em Kant: uma discussão com Zeljko Loparic
Palavras-chave:Radical evil, Freedom, Moral judgement, Maxim, Gesinnung
In the Zeljko Loparic´s article "Kantian solution of the fundamental problem of religion" (2008), he connect the originality of the doctrine of radical evil to the anthropological inflection of practice Kantian philosophy, whose culminating reflection would be presented in the Doctrine of Virtue and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. However, the discussion that I intend to do, with the interpretation offered by Loparic on Kantian doctrine of radical evil, has a more restricted purpose. I intend to focus on the following problem: in the Kant’s moral philosophy, the question of whether the moral evil refers essentially to the particular maxims or to the man’s character involves the difficulty on the relationship among Gesinnung, fundamental maxim and particular maxims. This difficulty can give rise to the claim that the fundamental maxim can not be the focus to assert the moral quality of actions, since it indicates a general plan of the particular maxim, while the moral quality of actions seems to depend more on particular maxim rather than fundamental maxim. According to Loparic, Kant argues in Religion the thesis that predicates morally good and morally bad should be applied primarily to man, ie the person's character. Thus, the question arises: what exactly is the target of ascription our moral judgements? Now, we can’t judge directly the man’s character, that is to say, we do not say that a man is good or evil because of an isolated action. So, what is the base to state that a man is evil? It will also be necessary to discuss if what the Religion offers, or suggests to offer, represents an alternative view, or is consistent with what we have learned about the moral evaluation in the Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason. I defend that Religion represents an alternative view.
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